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1
Refusing to Endorse: A Must Explanation 
for Pejoratives
Carlo Penco
1  IntroductIon
Since David Kaplan’s “The Meaning of ‘Ouch’ and ‘Oops’”, there has 
been a wide amount of discussions on every side of pejorative expressions 
or slurs, with different kinds of interpretations and new topics, like the 
problem of appropriation and perspectival shift.1 Picardi (2006, 2007) 
presents a set of suggestions concerning the use of pejoratives and their 
relation to the content of what is said. Her stance is antagonist towards 
a too easy “pragmatic” view of the matter, according to which a pejo-
rative doesn’t touch or is totally independent of what is said and only 
pertains to the level of implicatures or presuppositions. On the contrary, 
Eva claims that the use of a pejorative cannot be reduced to something 
always independent of the assertive content, and that the use of pejo-
ratives may pertain to the truth of the matter, given that it predicates 
something false of the class to which it refers. Therefore, she would be 
classified as belonging to the “semantic stance” proposed for instance 
by Hom (2008, 2010, 2012). According to the semantic stance, the 
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2  c. PEnco
derogatory content is part of the meaning of the pejorative (e.g. “nig-
ger” means something like “black and despicable because of it”), and 
therefore a sentence containing a slur attributes an empty property to 
the individual in question (Picardi 2006: 72), making the sentence either 
false or deprived of truth value. Although she claims that the deroga-
tive aspect of pejoratives is “part of a word’s literal meaning”, I think the 
morale of her papers points towards a wider view on the role of pejora-
tives than the semantic one. I will follow Eva’s analysis of multi-proposi-
tion view (§1), her attempt to make derogative terms impinge on truth 
conditions (§2), her reaction of Tim Williamson’s criticism of Michael 
Dummett (§3), her dubious attitude towards a presuppositional analysis 
(§4) and eventually, in (§5), I conclude with a solution that seems to 
prompt from her discontent with most answers to the problem of derog-
atory terms.
2  SEnSE, tonE and accomPanyIng thoughtS:  
a multIPlE ProPoSItIonS analySIS
In order to distinguish what a pejorative expression add to what is said, 
Kaplan (1999) distinguishes descriptives and expressives: the first describe 
what is or is not the case; the second display what is or is not the case 
under a certain perspective or attitude (two expressions may have the 
same information content and different expressive content). According 
to Kaplan himself, this distinction is not so distant from the Fregean 
analysis on the different contribution to content made by sense and tone. 
Picardi (2006, 2007) discusses the Fregean distinction in relation to the 
use of derogatory words. Frege considered tone or colouring as of prag-
matic significance and not pertaining to the truth-conditional content 
of an assertion (the assertoric content). Frege’s distinction antedates the 
distinction made by Paul Grice between what is said (truth-conditional 
meaning) and what is meant (conventional or conversational implica-
tures), as Picardi (2001) was one of the first to remark. A standard exam-
ple is given in Frege (1897) analysing the difference between:
1.  “That dog howled the whole night”
2.  “That cur howled the whole night”
According to Frege, the two sentences express the same truth-con-
ditional content: if the first is true, then the second also is true. Frege 
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REFUSING TO ENDORSE: A MUST EXPLANATION FOR PEJORATIVES  3
claims that (2), although expressing the disapproval of the speaker, can-
not be false if (1) is true. In fact, if we thought that the aversion of the 
speaker was part of the content, the sentence should be analysed as a 
conjunction of (1) “that dog howled the whole night” and something 
like (3) “all dogs are despicable and ugly”. Assuming that (3) is false, 
the conjunction of (1) and (3) would be false. Therefore, we could 
not accept the truth of sentence (2) given that it is an expression of a 
complex proposition whose truth-value is false. But we cannot assume 
that (2) is false while (1) is true, given that they refer to the same state 
of affair. Supported by this argument, Frege distinguished between 
thoughts whose assertion is expressed and thoughts that are not 
expressed, but only hinted at or “suggested”, in order to influence the 
audience. Suggesting something using a particular piece of the lexicon to 
refer to an individual does not concern the problem of truth and belongs 
to the realm of colouring or tone, which pertains to pragmatic aspects of 
language (Frege 1879, 1897, §3). The solution to the analysis of pejo-
ratives seems straightforward: conveying something suggested and not 
explicitly asserted, a sentence with a pejorative does not concern what is 
said, but what is meant, or the conventional implicature. Picardi is not 
happy with this solution and tries different ways to go beyond it.
First of all, Picardi criticises Frege for assuming too easily that “dog” 
and “cur” are coreferential. If so, the two terms should require substitut-
ability salva veritate, but there are counter examples:
To his neighbor’s utterance ‘That cur howled all night’, the owner of the 
dog may retorts, ‘That dog is not a cur’, but plainly he is not asserting 
that his dog is not a dog. Possibly, all curs are dogs, but not all dogs are 
curs. All that Frege is entitled to say is that there are contexts of utterance 
in which the difference in meaning between “cur” and “dog” makes no 
difference to truth-conditions of what is said, whereas there are other con-
texts in which the difference is salient. (Picardi 2006: 62)
The main claim given by this example is that we cannot take it for 
granted that a neutral term and a pejorative have always the same exten-
sion. However the disagreement between two speakers here does not 
grant the conclusion; in fact the two expressions (the neutral one and the 
derogative one) have the same extension in the mind of the dog hater, 
and when they are used to refer, the reference is normally successful 
because the interlocutor easily gets what the speaker has in mind. Saying 
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4  c. PEnco
that it is false that all dogs are curs is an expression of disagreement on 
the different uses of the words, not on the factual truth of the assertion 
of the speaker (whether the animal—in whichever way you want to refer 
to it—howled all night). It seems to me therefore that this argument is 
not strong enough to avoid the conclusion that assertions containing 
pejoratives have the same truth-conditional content than assertions with 
neutral terms, insofar the pejoratives are used to refer and are under-
stood as such.
What about a multi propositional analysis? Relying on a long tradi-
tion of research (Kent Bach, Robyn Carston, Francois Recanati), Picardi 
claims that the difference between “what is said” and “what is conven-
tionally implicated” is not sharp enough to decide without doubts when 
something belongs to the content of an assertion and when it does not, 
given that the choice may depend on the point of the assertion. A pos-
sible solution might be to translate the sentence (2) with an explicature 
(or a free enrichment), as:
4.  “That dog, which is despicable and ugly because of it, howled all 
night”.
With this peculiar rendering, we might answer to the Fregean strategy 
for which it is counterintuitive to take (2) as false considered as a con-
junction (“that dog howled and all dogs are despicable and ugly”). In 
fact, with (4) interpreted as an explicature of (2) we would really have a 
different proposition from (1) and we may admit—in this case—that the 
truth of the content of the main assertion (that the dog howled all night) 
is affected by the truth-value of the relative clause. This might be a possi-
ble “multi-propositional” solution of the relevance of pejoratives to what 
is said.
We may claim therefore that the use of the pejorative is intended to 
imply that the fact that dogs are despicable is a reason or a cause why 
they howl all night or vice versa. This last point seems the best way to 
explain Picardi’s criticism of Kaplan’s analysis of Frege’s accompanying 
thoughts (Nebengedanke) with which she shares much, but not all. The 
discussion starts with Frege’s example:
5.  “Napoleon, who recognized the danger to his right flank, person-
ally led his guards against the enemy position”
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REFUSING TO ENDORSE: A MUST EXPLANATION FOR PEJORATIVES  5
Picardi remarks that Frege realizes that “the clause expresses more 
through its connection with another than it does in isolation” (Frege 
1892: 47). A relative clause cannot be represented always with the same 
syntactic form. We have different ways to compose an accompanying 
thought expressed by a relative clause, and while some of them make it 
independent of the whole, other really affect what is said with the com-
posed sentence. In the case under discussion, Picardi suggests that what 
is said may be conceived as inserting a third thought, that is
6.  “the recognition of the danger is a reason why Napoleon led his 
attack”.
In this case, it becomes apparent that the accompanying thought may be 
part of what is said, given that it impinges on the truth-condition of the 
composed sentence. Picardi really makes a case about that. The conclu-
sion is that a pejorative may be treated as prompting a further proposi-
tion that cannot be conceived just as a conventional implicature, but as 
an explicature—that is part of what is said—presenting a point, such as 
individuating the reason explaining the content of the main clause: see-
ing the danger of his side is a reason for Napoleon to attack, or being 
ugly and despicable is a cause for the dog to howl all night—maybe 
because despicable animals just do that.
Although this is a possible analysis of pejoratives that makes justice 
of the idea that an assertion containing a pejorative may be just false, 
Picardi eventually rejects it. In fact she claims that the idea of a specific 
completion of a sentence because of a pejorative is not sound; following 
Sainsbury (2001), she claims that what is relevant with a sentence with 
expressive content is its lacking of specificity, and therefore the sentence 
“should not be construed as directed to an elliptical proposition that 
awaits to be spelled out in full” (Picardi 2006: 54).
3  do PEjoratIvE rEally ImPIngE on truth condItIonS?
Without the help of explicatures or free enrichment, however, it becomes 
difficult to claim that pejoratives pertain to the assertoric content, to 
what is said. Yet Eva, criticising Kaplan’s too sharp separation between 
expressives and descriptives, attacks the rendering of this distinction 
made by Potts (2005, 2008), who considers expressives as conventional 
implicatures. According to Potts the expressive meaning of a lexical item 
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6  c. PEnco
is independent of its descriptive meaning and therefore plays no role in 
determining the truth conditions. The main point of disagreement with 
the above distinction concerns the claim of independence of the expres-
sive content. Eva’s criticism of the idea of independence of expressives 
works on a basic question:
How can we consider the correctness of a reported speech in case the origi-
nal speech contained a pejorative?
At first sight, reporting an utterance with a pejorative like “that cur 
howled all night”, a lover of dogs would probably make a report of the 
kind: “x said that that dog howled all night”, abstaining to use the pejo-
rative term, but still thinking to have made a correct report of what hap-
pened, preserving at least the truth of the matter. But not everybody 
would agree of the correctness of the report. Eva refers to Bach (1999) 
whose argument for claiming that conventional implicatures belong to 
what is said is that they fail the indirect speech test; if you report John’s 
having said “Mary is pretty but intelligent” as “John said that Mary is 
pretty and intelligent”, Bach doubts that you have made a correct 
report. In the reported speech we should make it clear that the speaker 
intended a contraposition between the first and the second property. We 
should have an enriched proposition that could make explicit the content 
of the contrast. We have seen however that this is not the path followed 
by Eva. Which means are still available to fight a analysis of pejoratives 
based on the idea of conventional implicature?
Instead of following the multi-propositional analysis, Eva pinpoints 
another possible problem: the relevance of what is the “at-issue” content 
or the question under discussion (QUD). On this point she makes an 
example purporting to show the difficulty of sharply separating the asser-
toric content from the implicated content:
Whether my leaving out this piece of information renders my report wrong 
or simply inaccurate depends on what was the main point of the utter-
ance on the given occasion. And this, in its turn, depends on the audience  
I am addressing and on the focus of the conversation: in the course of an 
investigation that aims at discovering the culprit of evil deeds against dogs 
in a certain neighbourhood it may be useful to give a literal report of what 
the people involved say concerning dogs. In a different context, the report 
may be less accurate, if, for instance, our interlocutor simply wants to find 
out what a notoriously nagging neighbour was complaining about.
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REFUSING TO ENDORSE: A MUST EXPLANATION FOR PEJORATIVES  7
This is an ingenious effort to defend the claim that pejoratives enter 
the question of truth. But it seems to me that here we have two ques-
tions: one question concerns the facts described by the report, another 
question concerns the facts concerning the psychology of the speaker: 
if we are looking for a devious assassin of dogs, reporting the specific 
lexical item impinges on the latter. We might have evidence, although 
inconclusive, of the speaker’s tendency to perform crimes against dogs. 
Here, therefore, a literal report may be of fundamental importance to 
denounce the speaker. However, again, derogatory conceptualizations 
do not change the “strict” truth-conditional content of a description 
of a state of affairs. In fact, in this case, the truth evaluation concerns 
(the fact of) which words the speaker used, not which facts have been 
reported about the behavior of dogs.
In fact, “that cur” is a complex demonstrative, whose main role in the 
sentence is the identification of the referent; we may think that it pre-
sents the referent in a wrong way and, from this perspective, is not too 
dissimilar to a misdescription. A speaker may make a referential use of an 
inaccurate definite description assuming the hearer may understand the 
intended referent although the description is false of it, or at least defec-
tive (see also Penco 2010, 2017). From the point of view of truth condi-
tions, both misdescriptions and pejoratives may be considered defective 
but still able to make the hearer correctly understand the referential 
intentions.
Picardi (2006: 67) is well aware of the problem, and she refers to 
Donnellan on this point. Her use of the similarity with Donnellan’s cases 
helps to point out the difference between the case of misdescriptions and 
the case of pejoratives. In case of misdescriptions like “the man drinking 
champagne” (while he is drinking mineral water), there is no harm in 
using a defective or inaccurate or wrong definite description if your ref-
erential intentions are understood. On the contrary this does not happen 
with pejoratives. While with misdescriptions we are in front of a factual 
mistake, whose correction is easy to accept (“the person you are refer-
ring is not drinking chanpagne but mineral water”), in front of a deroga-
tory term you cannot simply change the term and be happy, because you 
are facing a strong disagreement: what is wrong from the point of view 
of dog lovers, may be strongly believed by the dog hater, who would 
not recede from his conceptualization of that class (dogs are despicable 
because of being dogs and blacks are inferior because of being black). 
Besides, given certain circumstances, I may easily report what a speaker 
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8  c. PEnco
said using the same misdescription to make myself understood, but this is 
not so with pejoratives. In fact I might feel uncomfortable using a pejo-
rative term, on whose grounds and consequences I don’t agree. But this 
does not mean that I don’t understand what the speaker said and I have 
to distinguish between the facts of the matter described and the point of 
view and attitude of the speaker.
As Dummett (2007: 527) says, commenting of Picardi’s paper, “the 
use of a pejorative expression certainly cannot be said to affect the truth-
value of an utterance; it affects its property. But, for the same reason, it 
also cannot simply be explained as affecting the tone of the utterance, 
or as attaching an implicature to it.” The offensive character of certain 
terms, Dummett claims, should be accounted for by “the license they 
give their user to draw inappropriate consequences”. In conclusion, we 
cannot use the test of reported speech to claim that pejorative impinge 
on the truth of the matter, although we may still take our awareness on 
“the tacit commitments we would undertake in accepting a certain way 
of referring to people or actions” as a ground to refuse to endorse an 
assertion (Picardi 2007: 507).
The question seems to shift from the truth-value of an assertion con-
cerning a state of affair (what did the dog do during the night?) to the 
justifications and consequences of assertions containing a pejorative. If 
truth conditions are not affected, pejoratives certainly affect assertibility 
conditions. Different lexical items are connected with different justifi-
cation and consequences, and using them obliges us to explain why we 
have used them and commits us to the consequences of what they mean. 
We are entering another kind of problem, that touches upon the mean-
ing of pejoratives: while it seems that truth conditions are affected only 
by the referents of pejoratives, assertibility conditions may be affected by 
their meanings. On the meaning of pejoratives, Picardi is very near to 
Dummett’s classical analysis and contrasts Williamson’s criticism of this 
analysis.
4  PEjoratIvES aS dEalIng wIth truth/aSSErtIbIlIty 
condItIonS
Picardi (2006, 2007) looks back at Dummett’s discussion on the logic 
of pejoratives. Dummett was interested in the logical role of pejoratives 
and in the logical motivations to reject their use. His claim was clear and 
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REFUSING TO ENDORSE: A MUST EXPLANATION FOR PEJORATIVES  9
simple: a pejorative like “Boche”—used to refer to Germans implying 
that Germans are more prone to cruelty than other Europeans—would 
produce a non conservative extension of the language where the word 
was not present: the use of “Boche” would permit inferences and con-
clusions that would not be permitted in the language missing the pejora-
tive (Dummett 1981: 454).
Dummett gives Introduction rules and Elimination rules for the term 
and shows how they permit conclusions impossible to be derived without 
the term. The Introduction Rule for “Boche” (or its condition of appli-
cation) would simply be something like
x is German
——————–
x is Boche
But the consequences of application embed the following inference 
(that might be considered the Elimination rule for “Boche”):
x is Boche
———————————————————
x is more prone to cruelty than other Europeans
Now, if we accept the Introduction and Elimination rules for Boche 
we should derive something of the following: Angela Merkel is German 
therefore is Boche, and if Angela Merkel is Boche, therefore, she is more 
prone to cruelty than other Europeans. We could not to derive this con-
clusion from our lexicon only if, following the elegant attitude of Oscar 
Wilde, we did not include the lexical item “Boche” in our dictionary.
Williamson launches an attack on radical inferentialism and defends 
a radical referentialist framework (although he recognizes that there 
are intermediary positions that might escape his criticism). He criticizes 
Boghossian (2003: 241–42) according to whom “plausibly, a thinker 
possesses the concept Boche just in case he is willing to infer according to 
[Dummett’s rules]”, with the following short argument:
Since understanding the word ‘Boche’ (with its present meaning) is pre-
sumably sufficient (although not necessary) for having the concept that 
‘Boche’ expresses, it follows that a willingness or disposition to reason 
according to Dummett’s rules is equally unnecessary for having that con-
cept. (Williamson 2009: 8–9)
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10  c. PEnco
This claim is correct, and maybe Boghossian went a bit too far. Let us 
assume that understanding a concept is understanding its introduction 
and elimination rules. Mastering those rules is not to be identified with 
willingness to follow them, but with an implicit knowledge of them. 
Understanding the meaning is understanding what it is or what it would 
be using that inference, even without explicitly doing so or even reject-
ing to endorse it. Williamson may accept that, but then—he would 
ask—which is the difference between an inferentialist and a referentialist 
account of understanding as a “practical” ability if we cut off the actual 
disposition to reason according to the rules? The answer is that, although 
there is no difference in “practical” ability, inferentialists are not content 
of getting the referent right: they require making the inferential connec-
tions explicit. Explicitly rejecting to use a term is exactly the point of the 
difference between a referentialist and an inferentialist view. You refuse 
to use a term because you reject the possible consequences of its use; 
referential rules on the other hand just point out that the reference of 
“German” is the same of the reference of “Boche”; the two classes are 
the same class:
differences between ‘Boche’ and ‘German’ apparently play no role in 
determining reference, and so make no difference to the way in which the 
terms contribute to the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur, 
a Fregean might even count ‘Boche’ and ‘German’ as having the same 
sense. Frege himself gives just such an account of another pejorative term 
(1979: 140): ‘cur’ has the same sense and reference as ‘dog’ but a different 
tone. (122)
Here we are. Again on Frege, and our examples of pejoratives for 
“dogs”! As we have seen, the main role of pejoratives does not concern 
just the role of reference fixing, as in case of definite descriptions, but 
their role in suggesting inferences to be accepted (conventional impli-
catures). On this point, Williamson himself concedes the idea that con-
ventional implicatures (something derivable and therefore linked to an 
inferential structure) of expressions like “Boche” are “part of their mean-
ing in a broad sense of meaning”. But, if we accept an idea of (broad) 
meaning as dealing with the inferences connected with an expression, 
then Dummett’s proposal is not incompatible with a view of pejorative as 
triggering a conventional implicature or a presupposition.
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REFUSING TO ENDORSE: A MUST EXPLANATION FOR PEJORATIVES  11
A way to interpret Dummett’s treatment of pejoratives is then to con-
sider it as a clarification of the rules behind what is expressed and not 
stated, rules that should be followed if one accepts the conventional 
implicature connected with the use of the pejorative. Accepting a pejo-
rative, we accept a network of inferences, a set of beliefs that the pejora-
tive brings with it. Using an assertion with a pejorative is not only saying 
something true with a bad psychological surrounding: it is accepting the 
consequences connected to the inferential meaning of the expression. 
We are back to the conclusion of the previous discussion: we understand 
the intended referents of singular terms or complex demonstratives like 
“that dog” or “that cur”, and we understand to which classes predicates 
like “German” or “Boche” refer; although sentences containing them 
may have, by substitution of coreferentials, the same truth conditions, 
they certainly haven’t the same assertibility conditions; in fact, to have 
the same assertibility conditions they should also have the same ground 
for justification, and we may claim, from our perspective, that nobody 
is justified to use “cur” or “Boche” given that those terms imply conse-
quences that we disagree about.
5  ProblEmS of PEjoratIvES aS PrESuPPoSItIon trIggErS
If a conventional implicature can be considered part of the “broad” 
meaning of an expression, then it seems that Picardi (2007: 508) her-
self makes a too strong contrast between “the decision to construe the 
explicit derogatory ingredient as a conventional implicature” on one 
hand and the idea of construing the derogatory ingredient “as consti-
tutive of word meaning” on the other. The two aspects are not antago-
nist: considering the derogatory ingredient as conventional implicature 
implies that its broad meaning is connected with the inferences that are 
derivable by its use and are suggested as “calculable” implicature.
However, speaking of inferences syntactically plugged into the lexi-
con, conventional implicatures may not be the best solution for treating 
pejoratives. The other solution is treating them as triggering presup-
positions. Actually conventional implicatures pass the S-Family test of 
presuppositions: they stand also when an assertion is made in negative, 
interrogative and modal form (“that cur didn’t howl all night”, “did that 
cur howl all night?”, “that cur might have howled all night”).
Let us then see what happens when treating pejoratives as presuppo-
sition triggers (for a defence of a presuppositional account see Schlenker 
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12  c. PEnco
2007; Macià 2014; Cepollaro 2015). Under this perspective, the use of 
a pejorative presupposes the set of beliefs that the pejorative intends to 
implicate. This should be coherent with the classical view of presuppo-
sitions for which an utterance of a sentence is appropriate if the presup-
position is shared by the participants of a conversation (Stalnaker 1974). 
We may consider the use of pejorative not appropriate if we do not share 
the presupposition; therefore, as Picardi (2007: 507) claims “we may 
abstain from accepting a statement made by others because we are aware 
of the tacit commitments we would undertake in accepting a certain way 
of referring to people or actions”.
This claim is perfectly adequate to a presuppositional analysis, and it 
seems to me that presuppositional analysis and the difference between 
truth conditions and assertibility conditions come hand in hand; abstain-
ing from endorsing a statement means rejecting the justifications or the 
intended background for its assertion.
A presentation of a presuppositional analysis might also be framed in 
Kaplan’s terminology. Kaplan (1999) was interested in the informational 
content that can be derived by expressives; in doing so he attempted 
to clarify the rules of correctness of expressives and the correspond-
ence of informational content given by expressives and by descriptions: 
the same semantic information can be given with an expressive mode 
(ouch, oops, hurray) or with a descriptive mode (“I am in pain” or “I 
have just observed a minor mishap” or “I am in state of joyful elation”). 
Kaplan describes the problem of giving the rules for correct application 
of expressives. And we might say that the felicity condition of the use of 
a pejorative is that (1) the person actually believes the information con-
tent expressed by the pejorative and (2) has the correct attitude or emo-
tion towards the class described by the pejorative. Utterances of “that 
Boche run away” or “that cur howled all night” are appropriate only if 
the speaker really believes that Germans are cruel as such or that dogs are 
despicable and ugly as such and has the appropriate emotion of distaste 
or dislike (see also Carpintero 2017). This is what presuppositional anal-
ysis amounts to.
However, the presuppositional analysis of pejoratives leaves unan-
swered some questions like the following:
1.  In using a slur in a re-appropriation case, people do not share the 
prejudice (the belief) attached to the term, yet it seems that their 
use is appropriate.
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2.  When people who have racist prejudices use the derogatory term 
we should say that their use is perfectly “appropriate” because 
they share the beliefs supporting that use, yet it sounds awkward, 
although correct for the theory, to say that the uses of derogatory 
terms are somehow “appropriate”.
3.  when a presupposition is expressed it ceases to be a presupposition 
and it is normally accepted while the presupposed content of a slur 
is typically a matter of disagreement when explicitly stated.
Leaving (1) and (2) to the reader, let us see the problem with (3). 
Accommodation (the process through which people accept presupposi-
tions that do not belong to the common ground) is not as normal as it 
is in standard cases (where, as Lewis says, presuppositions “spring into 
existence making what you say acceptable after all”). A non-xenophobe, 
or a non-racist, or a friend of dogs, would not easily accommodate the 
presupposition in a sentence that uses a pejorative. He would probably 
say, “Hey, wait a moment! Do you think that Germans are more prone 
to cruelty than other Europeans? It is not true” or “hey wait a moment! 
Do you think that all dogs are despicable? That’s false”. The problem 
arises because the presupposition triggered by a pejorative represents a 
content on which there may be very strong disagreement.
The main defect of presuppositional analysis is that it leaves something 
out; offensive or derogatory terms does not only pertain to the content 
of their presuppositions (and eventually the emotional attitude going 
with it); they also involve actions and commitments undertaken in their 
use.
6  PEjoratIvES aS hIghEr ordEr uttErancE modIfIErS
Eva makes a remark on Frege’s view of the derogatory ingredient 
attached to the word “cur”:
[according to Frege] in the given context the choice of “cur” instead of 
“dog” has the value of an exclamation, and, one may add, could be ren-
dered syntactically by means of an exclamation mark, much as assertoric 
force is rendered by means of a vertical stroke. Frege held that assertoric 
force only shows itself with the help of a suitable notation, but is not 
located in any part of speech in particular. Its scope is the whole utter-
ance, not a particular segment of it. The function of an interjection mark 
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14  c. PEnco
encapsulated, as it were, into the meaning of “cur” in the specific utter-
ance is to disclose the attitude of the speaker towards the matter at issue. 
It presents the dog as ugly or unpleasant from the speaker’s perspective; 
however, as Frege remarks, the dog itself may very well be a handsome 
representative of its race. But this circumstance does not render the use of 
the interjection incorrect, for in uttering as he did, the speaker might have 
wished to disclose his attitude of dislike or fear of dogs in general, not of 
this dog in particular. (Picardi 2006: 62–63)
Eva here refers also to Kaplan, who distinguishes between “truth simplic-
iter” and “truth with an attitude”, but—as we have seen—she does not 
agree to treat the expressive content merely as something propositional: 
“tone need not be expressible by means of a, let alone one specific, full-
fledged proposition” (Picardi 2007: 503). But which kind of non-propo-
sitional aspect can be conveyed by a derogatory expression?
Eva attributes the main reason for accepting the Fregean sugges-
tion of colouring as higher order utterance modifier to the fact that it 
detaches the notion of colouring from mere psychological significance.2 
A pejorative may impinge on the level of speech acts, on their felicity 
conditions or justification (or assertibility) conditions. This is a central 
point to be clarified.
Eva oscillates between two alternatives often connected: a multi-prop-
ositional account and a higher order account, both of which she tends 
to disregard. But I think she has been too quick with disregarding the 
idea of higher-order account, maybe because too strictly connected with 
the Gricean view. Speaking of higher order account we typically tend 
to consider the contribution of some words (expressions like “but” or 
pejoratives) as parasitic on a ground floor or central speech act (Grice 
1989: 361–62).3 But the idea of higher order modifier is not exhausted 
by Grice’s view of implicatures (nor by the presuppositional account). 
An alternative view may be defined for treating pejoratives as higher 
order modifiers that are not just parasitic aspects. Still keeping pejora-
tives as connected with a set of inferences (presupposed or implicated), 
Carpintero (2015, 2017) tries to give them a further role in the con-
text of dialogue. The novel point that Carpintero makes it where to insert 
the role of pejorative in the dialogue: not only as part of the content 
or as presupposed propositions, but as constraints on the context of dia-
logue. The main consequence of accepting derogatory expressions is 
the implicit acceptance of their presuppositional content, given by tacit 
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accommodation. Tacit accommodation implies tacit undertaking of a 
network of inferences and commitment to the consequences.
The main point made by Carpintero is, therefore, that common 
ground cannot be defined only in terms of shared propositions, but also 
in terms of different commitments towards those propositions; that’s 
why we feel so uncomfortable when we are included in a conversa-
tion where people use pejoratives on whose stereotypical inferences we 
strongly disagree. Already Stalnaker claimed that we have different atti-
tudes towards the contents of the common ground (see Domaneschi 
et al. 2014). But Carpintero’s point is stronger and can be summarised 
by the claim that our common ground is made not only of propositions 
and propositional attitudes but it also concerns attitudes linked to illocu-
tionary forces, which is a further level of pragmatic commitment.
Saying that the use of pejorative is linked to illocutionary force is a 
fundamental step, shared by many others. Langton (1993, 2012) calls 
“speech acts of subordination” those speech acts used to classify a tar-
get class as inferior, legitimate discrimination and deprive it of rights. 
But her examples are basically explicit acts of subordination like “Blacks 
are not permitted to vote”, where the act is a kind of “verdictive” and 
the speaker has authority to do that because he is in a social position 
that allows him to perform the act. Besides, in case the speaker has no 
authority, the accommodation of the presupposition (given by the failure 
to question the speaker) would confer authority to the speaker herself, as 
suggested by Maitra (2012) (McGowan 2004, 2009 speaks of “conversa-
tional” exercitives that, differently from Austin’s, do not require uptake 
from the hearers).
However most of the examples of this literature concern explicit 
and direct acts of subordination (like the above quoted “Blacks are not 
permitted to vote”), or hate speech that is characterised, among other 
things, by being directly addressed to the individuals whom they insult 
(see also Hornsby 2001: 297). On the contrary our examples (follow-
ing Frege’s example with “cur”) concern the use of derogative words 
in descriptions of facts or in questions, where the pejorative is part of a 
descriptive content of a phrase (complex demonstratives, definite descrip-
tions) whose main function is to pick a referent. How to describe the 
subtler way in which the insertion of a pejorative in a normal description 
of facts changes—to use Lewis’ terminology—the conversational score?
A first solution is to think of an indirect speech act: by putting a 
question such as “do you know what time is it?” I make a request; by 
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16  c. PEnco
describing a possible situation such as “I will not miss your date” I am 
making a promise. Following the analogy, we may say that by describ-
ing a situation with “that Boche run away”, or asking “have you seen 
that Boche running away?” I hereby promote discrimination and legiti-
mize behaviour of discrimination. We may think that the preparatory 
condition is not satisfied. If asked: “can you tell me the time?” I may 
answer: “Sorry, I have no watch”, making it clear that the preparatory 
condition of the request is not satisfied. Analogously, if asked: “have you 
seen a nigger running away?” I may answer: “Sorry, for me there are no 
nigger”, because the preparatory condition to the act of subordination 
requires that black people are inferior as such. But the analogy is not so 
clear: an indirect speech act is typically a speech act of a kind that is given 
by a speech act of a different kind. By a question we make a request, 
by a description we make a promise; in case of assertions or questions 
containing a derogatory term we are still making an assertion or a ques-
tion. Saying: “hey, wait a moment; he run away, but he is not a nigger” 
(as with rejecting a presupposition), we correctly answer the main speech 
act; while we cannot say to a question like “do you know the time” 
something like, “yes, we do, but unfortunately I have no watch”. The 
strategy of indirect speech act after all seems not to be a viable analysis.
A second possible answer, that seems to be more coherent with the 
main trend in contemporary discussion, is that speech acts with derog-
atory terms contain a peculiar adjunctive force: with the same utterance, 
we make two kinds of speech acts at the same time (Kissine 2013: 197): 
assertions, questions, commands, and other speech acts can be under-
stood as such, and at the same time, when containing a derogatory term, 
they are at the same time acts of “subordination”. And also, we have two 
contents: the (description of the) objective state of affairs (a person who 
runs away) and the (promotion of a) derogatory viewpoint concerning 
the individual and the group they belong to. Langton (2017) presented 
a similar idea at the ECAP Conference in Münich, speaking of “Blocking 
as Counter-speech” (e.g. you may assert something normal and at the 
same time, through a presuppositional trigger, convey something else 
like in “Even John could win!”).4 We may conclude that speech acts that 
contain derogatory terms (or other subtle means to give a diminishing 
perspective on the target) promote and legitimize subordination or other 
negative attitudes towards the referent class. And, most of the time,5 the 
subordination is derived by the use of a predicate that is false of the class 
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in question, for instance, because “the complex properties indicated by 
racist words are not instantiated” (Picardi 2006: 68).
Can we be content in saying that with pejoratives we make two speech 
acts at the same time? The idea of a speech act of subordination is still a 
pointer towards an idea to be refined, and we might distinguish levels of 
subordination, and also other kinds of acts depending on different kinds 
of pejoratives or on different targets or different social roles (on which 
see e.g. Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt 2017). The essential feature, besides the 
actual contempt or disregard of the target, is normally taken to be that in 
using a pejorative we act to promote and legitimize subordination. What 
is not yet clear is how this promotion is realised.
My suggestion is that who intentionally6 uses derogatory terms looks 
for company, for sharing the prejudice and avoiding feeling alone. His 
speech act constitutes a call for joint responsibility, asking for sharing 
an attitude towards the derogatory content, indirectly creating a con-
text of commitment to certain behaviour against the target. This is why 
rejecting to endorse an assertion or answering a question containing a 
pejorative is the fundamental reaction and avoids the trick of the use of 
derogatory terms; on the one hand it seems that the racist (or the dog 
hater) is just stating some facts and therefore we are ready to accept or 
reject the truth of the matter; but in stating some facts with a certain ter-
minology the racist (or the dog hater) is desperately asking for approval 
of his behaviour and his way of life, and for sharing his positive endeav-
our to promote this behaviour and way of life.
Summarizing, the use of a derogatory term in a normal speech act 
gives the act a new feature, besides promoting discrimination or sub-
ordination: it is a call for joint responsibility that commits co-conversa-
tionalists to participate in the actual subordination and deprecation of 
the individuals or classes defined with a pejorative. Therefore, the use 
of pejoratives is not just a question of informational content, or of tacit 
presuppositions, but it is promotion and legitimization of that content 
through tacit joint acceptance. In accepting a presuppositional content 
we ourselves turn to be promoters of that content, and not only making as 
if we believe it.
This seems to me a fairly acceptable rendering of the central core 
of Eva’s analysis concerning the relationship between assertion and 
endorsement:
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18  c. PEnco
I may refuse to endorse an assertion because its wording suggests a picture 
of reality that I do not share. (Picardi 2006: 62)
The central point of the refusal to endorse is rejecting the call for joint 
responsibility and leaving the racist alone. And probably, under this 
“illocutionary” view, we are allowed to say something stronger: the 
use of words not only “suggests” a picture of reality, but also actually 
 “promotes” it.
7  Summary
The connection between the speech act and the set of inferences con-
nected (either because of implicatures or because of presuppositions) 
with the pejorative expression builds up a new challenging problem on 
the relationship between truth conditions and assertibility conditions, 
and this seems to be the most relevant suggestion left by Eva’s paper. 
Rejecting to endorse an assertion containing derogatory terms aims both 
at preventing the derivations of other assertions whose content would 
entail what we regard as false, and at preventing the promotion of what 
we considered wrong attitudes towards the object of contempt.7
notES
1.  A short summary of different perspective is given in Bianchi (2014), 
Bianchi (2015) (also with reference to experimental approaches) and 
Cepollaro (2015).
2.  The main point is always to antagonize the reductio of the phenomenon 
of tone to the subjective alone, as Picardi (2007: 500) insists: “Tone is as 
much as conventional and objective feature of word meaning as sense is, 
and Frege erred in confining it to the realm of psychological association”.
3.  It is in his “Retrospective Epilog” included in Grice (1989), that Grice 
speaks of “Lower order” and “Higher order” Speech acts.
4.  Thanks to Laura Caponetto for suggesting this connection.
5.  Apparently we do not need a pejorative for an act of subordination, as in 
Langton’s example “Blacks are not permitted to vote”.
6.  Or, at least, sharing the presuppositions connected with the derog-
atory terms. Some people may be unaware of the derogatory aspects of 
a term, either by not having another “politically correct” term or just by 
not knowing the derogatory aspect of a term in a context of a community. 
Travelling abroad may put people at risk of being considered either racist 
or simply unpolite just by ignorance.
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7.  I would like to thank Filippo Domaneschi for his suggestions on an early 
draft of this paper and Paolo Leonardi for his careful reading and further 
suggestions, which, unfortunately, I feel to have been unable to follow 
properly. A special thank to Laura Caponetto for pointing out some mis-
takes and suggesting repair.
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